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INTRODUCTION
It is a common" practice in certain business and consumer contexts
to make use of three-way acquisitive transactions called "finance
leases."' The basic finance lease arises when a party, the "finance
lessee," wishes to acquire goods. The finance lessee engages a financing
party, the "finance lessor," to assist it. Pursuant to its agreement with
the finance lessee, the finance lessor buys the goods from a "supplier,"
a seller selected by the finance lessee, and in turn "leases" 3 the goods to
the finance lessee.
t A.B. 1983, Harvard University; M.A. 1986, University of California at San
Diego; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
I The United States Department of Commerce forecasted for 1988 that leasing
would account for $99.8 billion of the $328.8 billion spent by businesses on equipment.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1988, at 57-1. The pro-
portion of equipment leasing to total business investment in equipment has grown
yearly from 12.5% in 1978 to a predicted 30.4% for 1988. See id. at 57-1, -4. Since
1978, equipment leasing has grown twice as fast as total business investment in equip-
ment, and it was expected to grow 10.2% from 1987 to 1988. See id. at 57-1; see also
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
EQUIPMENT LEASING INDUSTRY 4 (1985) (making similar estimates for the years 1978
to 1983). Three-party transactions are a common form of leasing arrangement. See
Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. REV. 39, 42, 57-58
(1984).
2 This term is susceptible to different definitions. See Reisman & Mooney, Draft-
ing, Negotiating, and Construing the Equipment Lease-An Overview, in EQUIP-
MENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 1, 29 & n.90 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman eds.
1980) [hereinafter LEVERAGED LEASING]. As used in this Comment, the term "finance
lease" will refer to the set of transactions described in the accompanying paragraph in
the text. This usage should be compared with the definition in U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g),
which is based on the functions of the parties and thereby encompasses the sale-and-
leaseback situation. See infra note 62 and accompanying text; see also U.C.C. § 2A-
103(g) official comment (explaining application of the definition to sale-and-leaseback
transactions); infra notes 149-61 (discussing the definitions pertinent to finance leases).
Finance leases can be more complex than the basic situation described here and involve
more than three parties. See Shrank, Leveraged Leasing, in BASICS OF EQUIPMENT
LEASING 1987, at 327-32 (R. Bayer & I. Shrank co-chairmen); Fritch & Shrank,
Leveraged Leasing, in LEVERAGED LEASING, supra, at 211, 218-23. This Comment
will, however, focus on the three principal parties.
' Although the parties term this element of the transaction a "lease," whether it is
in fact a lease is a complex matter. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
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There are many ways to structure a finance lease. Depending on
the particular provisions of the agreements between the various parties,
the transaction between the finance lessor and the finance lessee may be
viewed under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or the "Code")
as either a "true" lease or as part of a transaction that creates a secur-
ity interest ("security interest lease").4 This distinction is important be-
cause a transaction involving a purported lease that creates a security
interest is treated under the Code as providing for a sale and the taking
of a security interest.5 A true lease, on the other hand, is treated simply
as a lease.6 Hence, if a purported lease actually involves a security
transaction, the sales aspects of the transaction will be governed by Ar-
ticle 2 (Sales) of the UCC, while the security aspects will be governed
by Article 9 (Secured Transactions). If a purported lease is a true lease,
however, it will be within the scope of the recently promulgated Article
2A (Leases).' Because some of the provisions in these articles differ
significantly, this distinction will affect the rights of all the parties to
the transaction.'
The differences between the operation of Articles 2 and 9 and Ar-
tide 2A are especially marked in the case of finance leases. Although
Article 2A generally follows Article 2,0 it also contains special rules for
true leases that are finance leases ("true finance leases"). Article 2A
recognizes that the issues underlying three-party finance leases are dif-
ferent from those implicated in ordinary two-party leases, and so it
deals explicitly with true finance leases."0 By contrast, neither Article 2
nor Article 9 provides any explicit treatment for security interest leases
that are finance leases ("security interest finance leases"); as a result,
those special rules that exist have been judicially created on an ad hoc
basis.11
" See U.C.C. § 1-201(37); infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
" See U.C.C. § 2A-102 ("This Article applies to any transaction, regardless of
form, that creates a lease.").
' Article 2A is a recent addition to the UCC. Associated with it are conforming
amendments to §§ 1-105, 1-201(37), and 9-113. The new article and conforming
amendments were adopted in 1987 by the American Law Institute and National Con-
ference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and have been introduced or enacted
in fourteen states as of August 1988. See Miller & Rohner, Introduction to the Uni-
form Commercial Code Annual Survey, 43 Bus. LAW. 1255, 1256 n.5 (1988); see also
Bayer, Personal Property Leasing: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 43
Bus. LAW. 1491, 1493 & n.16 (1988) (noting that Oklahoma has enacted Article 2A).
This Comment uses the text reproduced in 1A U.L.A. 417-97 (Supp. 1988).
8 See infra note 22.
9 See U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment.
'0 See infra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
11 See Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAW. 1605,
1618-21 (1981) (discussing attempts by courts to fashion rules to deal with finance
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This Comment examines one area in which finance leases that are
true leases and those that are security interest leases are treated differ-
ently: the remedy of revocation of acceptance. Revocation of acceptance
is a goods-oriented remedy that allows a buyer or lessee, in appropriate
circumstances, to return previously accepted goods to the seller or lessor
and recover any payments already made. 2 In an ordinary two-party
sale or lease, it involves the right of a buyer or lessee to terminate the
contract and recover damages when the goods received are sufficiently
nonconforming."3 In the three-party setting of the finance lease, revoca-
tion is more complicated. Additional issues arise, including whether the
finance lessee may seek this remedy against the supplier or the finance
lessor, or both, and whether the finance lessor may revoke against the
supplier."' These questions become particularly important when the
supplier is unable or unwilling to perform on its obligations or pay
damages, for then the answer to whether the finance lessee has a right
of revocation against the finance lessor will determine which of the two
bears any loss resulting from the nonconforming goods. 5 Under Arti-
cles 2 and 2A, revocation of acceptance is expressly available to ordi-
nary buyers, to ordinary lessees under true leases, and, in limited in-
stances, to finance lessees under true finance leases." However,
according to the one reported case to decide this issue generally, Gen-
eral Electric Credit Corp. v. Ger-Beck Machine Co. ("GECC"),'7 revo-
cation of acceptance is not available to finance lessees under security
interest finance leases.' s
In Part I, this Comment examines the distinction drawn in the
Code between true leases and security interest leases and the effect of
this distinction on how three-party transactions are perceived under the
Code. Part II discusses the considerations underlying the remedy of
revocation of acceptance. Part III compares Article 2A's treatment of
revocation of acceptance in a true finance lease with the treatments ad-
vanced by the majority and dissent in GECC in the context of a security
interest finance lease. The Comment argues that, at least with respect
to revocation of acceptance, the policy concerns implicated in a security
interest finance lease are the same as those implicated in a true finance
lease. It then suggests that Article 2A's treatment of true finance leases
lease issues in pre-Article 2A cases).
ee ra notes 92-121 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 188-217 and accompanying text.
1, See infra notes 105-10 & 240-42 and accompanying text.
i See infra notes 98-100 & 188-217 and accompanying text.
17 806 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1986).
"I See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
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successfully addresses these policy concerns and concludes that, despite
GECC, the same treatment should be adopted by the courts in the con-
text of security interest finance leases.1 9
I. THE TRUE LEASE VERSUS THE SECURITY INTEREST LEASE
Whether a transaction that the parties characterize as a lease is
deemed2" to be a lease or to create a security interest under the UCC
determines whether it will be governed by the article on leases (Article
2A) or by the articles on sales (Article 2) and secured transactions (Ar-
ticle 9).2" This generally makes a great deal of difference not only to
the parties involved, but to third parties as well.22 One particular dif-
ference lies in Article 2A's explicit treatment of finance leases, which
'" At this point, a note on terminology is required. In the pre-Article 2A Code,
there was no definition of "lease"; nevertheless, pre-amendment § 1-201(37) made it
clear that a lease may or may not be "intended as security." Leases not intended as
security are generally referred to as "true" leases. Leases that are intended as security
are often called "security interest leases." Amended § 1-201(37) substituted "transac-
tion [that] creates a security interest" for "lease intended as security," because the pre-
vious definition's "[reference to the intent of the parties . . . has led to unfortunate
results." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official comment. Furthermore, because the new defini-
tion of "lease" in § 2A-103(1)0) excludes the "retention or creation of a security inter-
est," the notion of a "lease intended as security" has become a contradiction in terms.
In an apparent drafting oversight, however, § 9-408, which was not amended on the
introduction of the new article, continues to use that term.
Unfortunately, the Article 2A amendments, having recast the meaning of "lease,"
provide no alternative term for something that may be either a true lease or a security
interest disguised as a lease when the nature of the transaction has not been resolved.
See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (providing that the nature of a lease should be "determined by
the facts of each case"). "Purported lease" could serve such a function, along with the
related terms "purported lessor" and "purported lessee." Because, however, un-
restricted use of these terms would be cumbersome, this Comment will continue to use
the pre-Article 2A terminology unless use of the adjective "purported" is necessary for
clarity in the particular context. Note that amended § 1-201(37) itself refers to "the
lessee" in a transaction that creates a security interest.
To further simplify the terminology used in this Comment, lessees under security
interest leases will be referred to as "security interest lessees," while lessees under true
leases will be termed "true lessees." Lessees under security interest finance leases will
be called "security interest finance lessees," and lessees under true finance leases will be
"true finance lessees." Analogous terminology will be used for lessors.
20 See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
22 For example, a lessor must usually file a financing statement for a lease in-
tended as security if it wishes to perfect its security interest and protect its rights in the
leased property against other claimants. See U.C.C. § 9-302. Another important differ-
ence lies in the greater protection given to a lessee under a security interest lease after
the lessee's default. The security interest lessee is given rights to redeem the leased
property, see id. § 9-506, and to claim any surplus from the lessor's disposition of the
property, see id. § 9-504(2), while the true lessee is not, see id. § 2A-527(5). This
greater protection is given because a security interest lessee is considered to have an
equity interest in the property, while a true lessee is not. See id. § 2A-527(5) official
comment.
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has no corresponding treatment in Articles 2 and 9. To fill this gap,
some courts have attempted to parse transactions into their constituent
elements.23 They recharacterize the structure of finance leases so that
their components may be regarded as sales, leases, or security interests.
This Part argues that recharacterizing a security interest finance lease
24
into components recognizable under Articles 2 and/or 9 is not helpful,
because doing so requires that courts make unwarranted generaliza-
tions regarding the substance and function of the transaction created by
the parties. Such an approach is not as direct and accurate as focusing
on the exact bargain between the parties.
A. "Lease" or "Security Interest"?
Under the UCO, "lease" and "security interest" are mutually ex-
clusive terms. A lease is defined in section 2A-103(1)(j) as "a transfer
of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for
consideration, but a sale . . . or retention or creation of a security in-
terest is not a lease."' 25 Whether a security interest has been created or
retained in a transaction is therefore critical in classifying the
transaction.
The test of "[w]hether a transaction creates a lease or security in-
terest" is set out in considerable detail by amended section 1-201(37).21
23 See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
24 For a discussion of the terminology used in this Comment, see supra note 19.
25 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j).
2 Amended § 1-201(37) provides:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation ...
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is deter-
mined by the facts of each case; however, a transaction creates a security
interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to
possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease
not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the re-
maining economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining eco-
nomic life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal addi-
tional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compli-
ance with the lease agreement.
A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it
provides that
(a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay
the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially
equal to or is greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time
1989]
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This revised section is the result of much discussion by courts and com-
mentators as to what distinguishes true leases from leases intended as
security. As now codified, the distinction is based on the economic
realities of the transaction.2 8 The first two tests presented in the second
the lease is entered into,
(b) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes,
insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance
costs with respect to the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner
of the goods,
(d) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is
equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the
use of the goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is to be
performed, or
(e) the lessee has an option to- become the owner of the goods for a
fixed price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair
market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed.
For purposes of this subsection (37):
(x) Additional consideration is not nominal if (i) when the option to
renew the lease is granted to the lessee the rent is stated to be the fair
market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal deter-
mined at the time the option is to be performed, or (ii) when the option to
become the owner of the goods is granted to the lessee the price is stated to
be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option is
to be performed. Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the
lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agree-
ment if the option is not exercised;
(y) "Reasonably predictable" and "remaining economic life of the
goods" are to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances
at the time the transaction is entered into; and
(z) "Present value" means the amount as of a date certain of one or
more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain. The dis-
count is determined by the interest rate specified by the parties if the rate
is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into;
otherwise, the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate
that takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case at the time
the transaction was entered into.
2'7 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 2A-103(1)() official comments; see also Coogan,
Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis
of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909, 954-73 (asserting that
the standards contained in pre-amendment § 1-201(37) were inadequate for distin-
guishing a true lease from a secured transaction); Hawkland, The Impact of the Uni-
form Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446, 450 ("The
difference between a true lease and a security transaction lies in whether the lessee
acquires an equity ownership through his rent payments."); Mooney, supra note 11, at
1610-15 (describing the "hodge-podge of subjective and extraneous criteria" used to
distinguish true leases from security interests). For synopses of court opinions discuss-
ing the distinction between true leases and leases intended as security, see Mooney,
True Lease or "Lease Intended as Security"-Treatment by the Courts, in 1C SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (MB) 2913
(1988).
2 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official comment; see also Cooper, Identifying a Per-
sonal Property Lease Under the UCC, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 195, 233-47 (1988) (agreeing
with Article 2A's economic realities approach).
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paragraph of section 1-201(37)2" determine whether a security interest
is created by examining whether the lessee is obligated to become the
effective owner of the goods. The second two tests in that paragraph"0
focus on whether the lessee is compelled, in an economic sense, by the
terms of the agreement to become the effective owner of the goods. In
each of these situations, the economic realities facing the lessee are in
practical terms identical to those of an owner of goods subject to a se-
curity interest. In all cases, the lessee continues to pay rent until it
owns the goods, or until the goods are not worth anything to anyone
else, and if the lessee does not pay, the lessor is empowered to repossess
the goods.
The third paragraph of section 1-201(37)1 lists five factors that
alone will not distinguish security interest leases from true leases. The
first three clauses state that full payout leases, 2 net leases, 3 and leases
with options to renew or buy34 are not necessarily security interest
leases. The last two clauses specify that the same is true for leases with
options for fair market value renewal3 5 or fair market value purchase. 8
The final paragraph provides economic definitions of nominal consider-
ation, remaining economic life, and present value.
37
B. Scope of the Articles
If a transaction is a true lease, it is subject to Article 2A.38 If,
however, a transaction is a purported lease that creates a security inter-
est, Articles 2 and 9 govern. Article 9 is relevant because it applies to
"any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest."3'9 Article 2 also applies, because it governs "transac-
29 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a) to (first b).
30 See id. § 1-201(37)(first c) to (first d).
3' See id. § 1-201(37)(second a) to (e).
32 See id. § 1-201(37)(second a) (referring to leases in which the lessee is obli-
gated to make payments over the term of the lease that equal or exceed the value of the
leased goods).
11 See id. § 1-201(37)(second b) (referring to leases in which the lessee is respon-
sible for the incidental expenses associated with use or maintenance of the leased
goods).
. See id. § 1-201(37)(second c).
See id. § 1-201(37)(second d).
8 See id. § 1-201(37)(e).
See id. § 1-201(37)(x) to (z).
38 See id. § 2A-102 ("This Article applies to any transaction, regardless of form,
that creates a lease.").
"' Id. § 9-102(1)(a). There are some exceptions to this statement that are not
important here. See id. § 9-104. Article 9 also applies to sales of accounts or chattel
paper, see id. § 9-102(1)(b), as illustrated in transactions C, see infra note 55 and
accompanying text, and C, see infra text following note 62.
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tions in goods."4 0
Because a lease of goods is a "transaction in goods," there is a
potential for a conflict in scope between Articles 2 and 2A.4 Of course,
most of the provisions in Article 2 refer to a "buyer," a "seller," or a
"sale." These terms are, however, not defined precisely enough to con-
fine the scope of Article 2: "[a] 'sale' consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price";"' "[b]uyer' means a person who
buys or contracts to buy goods"; 43 and "'[s]eller' means a person who
sells or contracts to sell goods."
4
4
Undoubtedly, the drafters kept these terms vague to allow room
for judicial interpretation. 5 Indeed, many Article 2 provisions have
been applied directly or through analogy to true leases.48 Now that the
Code contains an article that deals explicitly with true leases, however,
courts no longer need to expand the scope of Article 2 to encompass
them. To the contrary, as this Comment argues, courts should instead
expand the scope of Article 2A, at least in the context of finance leases
and revocation of acceptance.
C. Recharacterization
To illustrate the scope of Articles 2 and 2A, consider the case of a
simple two-party leasing agreement. If the transaction creates a true
lease, then it is governed by Article 2A. 8 On the other hand, if the
purported lease in such a two-party transaction is a security interest
lease, then the transaction is treated as a sale by the purported lessor to
the purported lessee, with a retention of a purchase money security
interest49 in the goods by the lessor. In such a case, the sales aspect of
40 "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of ... [a] sale is
intended to operate only as a security transaction." Id. § 2-102 (emphasis added). Be-
cause a security interest lease involves, in addition to the creation of a security interest
in the leased goods, the transfer of ownership in the goods, the restriction in § 2-102
does not apply. See infra notes 48-51, 224-27 & 233-35 and accompanying text.
"I See, e.g., J.L. Teel Co. v. Houston United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851, 855
(Miss. 1986) ("An equipment lease is certainly a 'transaction in goods'." [sic] (quoting
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-102 (1972))); cf. May Co. v. Trusnik, 54 Ohio App. 2d 71,
73, 375 N.E.2d 72, 74 (1977) ("A 'transaction' as it is used in U.C.C. 2-102 encom-
passes a far wider activity than a 'sale.'" (citation omitted)).
42 U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
4 Id. § 2-103(1)(a).
Id. § 2-103(1)(d).
See id. § 1-103 (stating that case law applies unless particular provisions of the
Code are to the contrary).
48 See infra note 104; infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
, See U.C.C. § 9-107 (defining as a purchase money security interest the extent
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the lease is governed by Article 2, while the security aspect of the lease
is governed by Article 9.50 This is relatively straightforward because it
is the only way to recharacterize such a two-party transaction.51
In a three-party finance lease, however, there are three ways to
recharacterize the transaction if it turns out to be a lease intended as
security:
(A) "Lessor, '5 2 after buying the goods from "Supplier,"
sells the goods to "Lessee," financing that sale and taking a
purchase money security interest in the goods;
53
(B) Lessee borrows funds from Lessor and purchases
the goods from Supplier with the funds, at the same time
giving Lessor a purchase money security interest in the
goods.r
(C) Supplier sells the goods to Lessee, financing the sale
and taking a purchase money security interest in the goods;
then Supplier assigns or sells the security interest associated
with the sale to Lessor.5"
These three characterizations present significantly different trans-
actional structures that are treated differently under Articles 2 and 9.
First, in variants A and B, Lessee is deemed to give Lessor the security
interest, while in C, Lessee is deemed to give it to Supplier. Thus,
to which the security interest secures either the purchase of the collateral or value given
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or use of the collateral).
'0 See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
"I This is reflected in U.C.C. § 9-206(2), which states: "When a seller retains a
purchase money security interest in goods the Article on Sales (Article 2) governs the
sale and any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the seller's warranties."
82 The parties are given labels in this Section to facilitate comparisons between the
recharacterizations. The labels do not necessarily reflect the role of the parties in each
case. c 5 See, e.g., General Electric Credit Corp. v. Ger-Beck Machine Co., 806 F.2d
1207, 1212 (3d Cir. 1986) (dissenting opinion) ("[T]he transaction between GECC
[Lessor] and Ger-Beck [Lessee] was not merely a financing arrangement, but also a
sale of equipment.").
" See, e.g., id. at 1209 ("[P]laintiff [Lessor] provided nothing . . . except the
money to finance Ger-Beck's [Lessee's] acquisition of the lathe from the supplier.");
Miller Auto Leasing Co. v. Weinstein, 189 N.J. Super. 543, 547, 461 A.2d 174, 176-
77 (1983) ("Plaintiff [Lessor] provided nothing here except the . . . money . . . to
fund this sale. . . between Z & W [Supplier] and defendants [Lessees]."); cf. Citicorp
Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Institutional Distribs., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 511, 517 (W.D. Okla.
1977) ("[P]Iaintiff [Lessor] is not an assignee of commercial paper . . ").
88 See, e.g., Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d
624, 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (dissenting opinion) ("The full evidence proves . . . a
straightforward, consummated two-party equipment lease-purchase between King-
Louie [Lessee] and IGM [Supplier] which Funding Systems [Lessor] then adopted and
assumed from IGM."); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W.
Burns, 710 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the trial court referred
to Tri-Continental [Lessor] as Supplier's "assignee").
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Supplier is outside the scope of Article 9 in A and B, but is subject to
Article 9 in C. As a practical matter, Supplier in A and B is paid the
entire purchase price at the outset, so it no longer cares if Lessee keeps
up with its payments to Lessor, but Supplier in C may be responsible
to Lessor if Lessee does not pay.56
Another difference between the three alternatives turns on who is
deemed the seller. In A, Lessee is treated as having bought the goods
from Lessor, but in B and C, Lessee is considered to have bought from
Supplier. In A, therefore, Lessor is subject to the provisions of Article
2, while in B and C, Supplier is subject to them. Consequently, Lessor
is obligated to Lessee on any warranties that may exist in the sale in
the case of A, but not in B and C.57 Another effect, the focus of this
Comment, is that in A, and sometimes C, but not in B, Lessor is also
subject to rejection of the goods and to revocation of acceptance of the
goods by Lessee.
58
On the basis of these differences, it might seem straightforward to
select the recharacterization that applies to any particular finance lease.
These three interpretations, however, are also similar in several essen-
tial respects. First, their forms all reflect transactional structures that
are in common use in commercial settings 9 and therefore cannot be
distinguished on the basis of commercial utility. In addition, any of the
three scenarios could arise from a situation in which all three of the
parties negotiated with each other and arranged for the steps in the
transactions to occur substantially contemporaneously; thus, privity or
simultaneity in the transactions is not necessarily a distinguishing fac-
tor.60 More important, however, these three alternative transactions
" Supplier will guarantee Lessee's payments if it sells its security interest to Les-
sor with recourse. See Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935,
936-38 (1969), reprinted in 1C SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (MB) 2877, 2879-82 (1988).
" In some C assignment situations, however, Lessor's claim to payment may be
subject to Lessee's defense that Supplier has not performed on its warranties. See King
Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 644 (dissenting opinion) ("Funding Systems [Lessor] succeeded
to the obligations for warranty, fair dealing and conscionability of contract that accrued
to King Louie [Lessee] under the original terms of sale . . ... "); infra notes 171-73
and accompanying text.
58 See infra note 64-147 and accompanying text.
5 See Boss, supra note 1, at 57-58; Reisman, Assignment of Equipment Leases by
Sale or as Collateral, in LEVERAGED LEASING, supra note 2, at 883, 884-87.
60 Privity and simultaneity would be relevant factors if the two steps involved in
each of the three variants were taken independently and were separated by a substan-
tial intervening period. It could then be argued more convincingly that no recharacter-
ization is necessary and that the two steps should be treated independently, as struc-
tured by the parties. See King Louie, 597 S.W.2d at 632 ("The closely interrelated
nature of all these steps as part of a single integrated transaction distinguishes this
[finance lease] sharply from [a case in which the two transactions were separated by
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serve the same basic function and achieve the same basic result as a
security interest finance lease. In all three, Lessee has bought the goods,
although not necessarily from Supplier; Supplier has sold the goods,
although not necessarily to Lessee; and Lessor has acquired a purchase
money security interest in the goods. Furthermore, in all three cases,
Lessor serves a financing function. Clearly, then, the three variants
cannot be distinguished on the basis of the above criteria alone.
Similarly, finding the variant that is most similar in form to the
transaction as structured by the parties is unhelpful. Variant A in basic
form resembles the basic finance lease, with the difference being that,
in the finance lease, Lessor leases to Lessee, while in A Lessor sells to
Lessee. This is a simplistic analysis, however, because the basic finance
lease can be structured in alternative ways to achieve the same basic
object. Just as A, B, and C describe three different situations in which
the underlying transaction is a sale, there is a corresponding lease situ-
ation for each variant that closely follows its form:
(A) Lessor, after buying the goods from Supplier, leases the
goods to Lessee.61
(B') Lessee buys the goods from Supplier, then sells them to
Lessor, who leases them back to Lessee.62
(C') Supplier leases the goods to Lessee, then assigns or sells
its rights in the lease to Lessor.
The results in these three lease characterizations, as well as the three
sales variants, are similar in three important ways: (i) Lessee acquires
the use of the goods it selected; (ii) Supplier has sold the goods or rights
in them; and (iii) Lessor is entitled to payments from Lessee, so that if
Lessee should fail to make the payments, Lessor will have the power to
remove the goods from Lessee's hands. Therefore, similarity of form
should not be a basis for recharacterization.
Rather, in order to recharacterize a finance lease correctly, one
needs to look beyond the form and basic function chosen by the parties
to the total agreement between them. For example, the parties may
have structured a basic finance lease, but intended that the supplier
guarantee the finance lessee's payment of "rent" to the finance lessor.63
months]."). But see Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 281 &
n.3, 329 A.2d 28, 31 & n.3 (1974) (invoking equitable estoppel to override the lack of
privity when a lease was not executed until nearly two months after the equipment was
sold and delivered).
"1 This is the basic finance lease as described in the Introduction. See supra notes
1-3 and accompanying text.
82 This is a sale-and-leaseback.
6 See, e.g., Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 701 n.2, 324 S.E.2d
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Such a transaction might properly be recharacterized as an example of
variant C or C, depending on whether the lease is a security interest
lease or a true lease, but only for purposes of the guarantee. Indeed, it
is possible that in the same transaction the lessee may look to the lessor
to perform on some of the warranties. Then, for purposes of perform-
ing on those warranties, the transaction more closely resembles variant
A orA'.
If, however, the correct recharacterization of a particular transac-
tion in a particular context depends upon the intent of the parties, then
recharacterization is a method that assumes the result before the analy-
sis is performed. It is more direct to determine separately what the par-
ties intended with respect to each issue and apply that intent to the
particular issue. Recharacterization, then, is at best a way to analogize
the security interest finance lease to transactions that are squarely dealt
with under Articles 2 and 9 or Article 2A.
II. REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
As discussed in Part I, whether a finance lease is a true lease or a
security interest lease determines whether Article 2A or Articles 2 and
9 of the Code govern. In either case, the Code provides for a remedy
called revocation of acceptance." Although the provisions in Articles 2
and 2A differ to a degree, they reflect a similar framework. 5 That
framework consists of the rules governing acceptance, rejection, cure,
and revocation. Taken together, these goods-oriented concepts allow a
party to a sale or lease contract to place the ultimate responsibility for
the goods, in terms of ownership or the right to possession and use, on
another party."8 The rules, stated briefly, work as follows: After a
seller/lessor 7 or supplier tenders delivery of the goods to the buyer/
lessee, the buyer/lessee has the option of accepting the goods or, if they
are nonconforming, rejecting them. If the goods are rejected, the seller/
462, 466 n.2 (1985) ("Hub Motor [Supplier] signed the lease as guarantor, uncondi-
tionally guaranteeing to Hub Leasing [Lessor] full performance by Freeman [Lessee] of
all his obligations.").
See U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2A-517.
65 See id. § 2A-101 official comment ("Many of the provisions of [Article 2] were
carried over, changed to reflect differences in style, leasing terminology or leasing
practices.").
66 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-1 (2d ed. 1980).
6' The terms "seller/lessor" and "buyer/lessee" are equivalent to "purported les-
sor" and "purported lessee," respectively. See supra note 19. These terms are intro-
duced in this Part to underscore the similarities between Articles 2 and 2A and to
demonstrate the articles' separate applicability to different issues arising under a pur-
ported lease.
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lessor or supplier may have the opportunity to cure the nonconformity
by making another tender of delivery. If the goods are eventually ac-
cepted, the buyer/lessee may still have recourse to revocation of accept-
ance if there is a nonconformity that substantially impairs the value of
the goods. After rejection or revocation, the buyer/lessee may cancel the
contract.6" The following discussion treats in detail acceptance, rejec-
tion, cure, and revocation, including the ways in which rejection and
revocation may be limited, in the contexts of sales and true leases.
A. Acceptance
Acceptance of the goods is the first option available to a buyer/
lessee. It can occur only after the buyer/lessee has had a "reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods." 69 In addition, acceptance requires
that the buyer/lessee either: (i) "signifies" ' or, optionally, in the case
of a lease, "acts with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies,""1
to the seller/lessor or supplier "that the goods are conforming or that
[it] will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity" ' 2 or (ii)
"fails to make an effective rejection. '7 3 In the case of a sale, acceptance
also occurs if the buyer "does any act inconsistent with the seller's own-
ership" without regard to whether it had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect.74 This last mode of acceptance was not incorporated into Arti-
cle 2A, because the drafters considered it "irrelevant given the lessee's
possession and use of the leased goods."7 5
B. Rejection
One important effect of acceptance is that it "precludes rejection of
the goods accepted."176 Subject to rules on installment contracts and con-
tractual limitation of remedies, the buyer/lessee may reject the goods
"if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in any respect to conform" to
the contract.77 Because the buyer/lessee may reject the goods if any
aspect of the tender is nonconforming, the Article 2 provision has been
68 See generally J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, §§ 8-1 to 8-4 (discuss-
ing rejection, revocation of acceptance, cure, and acceptance).
69 U.C.C. §§ 2-606(1)(a), 2A-515(1).
70 Id. §§ 2-606(1)(a), 2A-515(1)(a).
7 Id. § 2A-515(1)(a).
72 Id. §§ 2-606(1)(a), 2A-515(1)(a).
73 Id. §§ 2-606(1)(b), 2A-515(1)(b).
74 Id. § 2-606(1)(c).
71 Id. § 2A-515 official comment.
78 Id. §§ 2-607(2), 2A-516(2).
77 Id. § 2A-509(1); see also id. § 2-601 (employing "tender of delivery" instead
of "tender or delivery").
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said to embody the "perfect tender rule.""8
The perfect tender rule follows from the definition of "con-
forming": Goods or performance under a contract are "conforming"
when they are "in accordance with the obligations under" the con-
tract."9 This self-evident statement seems to leave little or no room for
interpreting as "conforming" goods or performance that are merely
substantially or essentially in accordance with the obligations under the
contract. However, the official comment elaborates:
It is in general intended to continue the policy of requiring
exact performance by the seller of his obligations as a condi-
tion to his right to require acceptance. However, the seller is
in part safeguarded against surprise as a result of sudden
technicality on the buyer's part by the provisions of Section
2-508 on seller's cure of improper tender or delivery. More-
over usage of trade frequently permits commercial leeways
in performance and the language of the agreement itself
must be read in the light of such custom or usage and also,
prior course of dealing, and in a long term contract, the
course of performance.80
Many commentators have also noted that the perfect tender rule is
but "a mere shadowv of its formerly robust self."81 Indeed, there are
several ways in which the perfect tender rule is weakened by other
78 See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article 2, 73 YALE L.J. 199,
206 (1963).
79 U.C.C. §§ 2-106(2), 2A-103(1)(d).
80 Id. § 2-106 official comment. Because this principle can be applied to leases as
well, this statement of policy is incorporated by reference into § 2A-103. See id. § 2A-
101 official comment ("[T]he official comments to those sections of Article 2 whose
provisions were carried over are incorporated by reference in Article 2A."). The weight
to be given such a statement of policy is considerable, see E. FARNSWORTH & J. HON-
NOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 8-11 (4th ed. 1985), especially
when there is no conflict between the text and the official comment, see infra notes 81-
85 and accompanying text.
81 Peters, supra note 78, at 206; see also B. CLARK & C. SMITH, THE LAW OF
PRODUCT WARRANTIES, 7.02[2], at 7-11 (1984) ("Indeed, the courts rarely give full
effect to the perfect tender rule."); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 8-3, at
304 (noting that "even before enactment of the Code, the perfect tender rule was in
decline"); Comment, Substantial Performance: The Real Alternative to Perfect Tender
Under the U.C.C., 12 Hous. L. REV. 437, 440-41 (1975) (crediting the Code with
mitigating the harsh effects of the absolute perfect tender rule); Note, Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Sales-Sections 2-508 and 2-608-Limitations on the Perfect-Tender
Rule, 69 MicH. L. REV. 130, 132 (1970) (noting that the Code expressly limits the
perfect tender rule embodied in § 2-601 with Code provisions such as §§ 2-612, 2-718,
and 2-719).
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provisions of the Code. First, as mentioned in the offical comment, 2 a
seller/lessor may be able to avail itself of the cure provisions, which are
discussed below.8" The perfect tender rule is further weakened by spe-
cial rules concerning commercial impracticability. 4 Finally, in addition
to any applicable trade usage, course of dealing, or course of perform-
ance, the obligation of good faith that is read into every contract will
also prevent rejection for bad faith reasons. With these rules, courts are
given substantial latitude to find a rejection unwarranted in the
circumstances.85
In order to make an effective rejection, the buyer/lessee must
make the rejection "within a reasonable time" after tender or delivery
of the goods and "seasonably notif[y]" the seller/lessor of the rejec-
tion."8 If the rejection is not effective, then acceptance results.8 7 Even if
the rejection is effective, however, the seller/lessor may have the option
to cure the nonconformity, if it can, and make another tender of goods.
C. Cure
If "the time for performance has not yet expired," the seller/lessor
or supplier may "seasonably notify the [buyer/lessor] of [its] intention
to cure" and then "make a conforming delivery" within the time pro-
vided in the contract.88 Furthermore, even though the contract time
may have expired, if the seller/lessor or supplier "had reasonable
grounds to believe [that the non-conforming tender] would be accept-
able with or without money allowance," then it may have "a further
reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender" if it "seasonably no-
tifies the [buyer/lessee]."8 9 The official comment explains that this last
82 See U.C.C. § 2-106 official comment.
83 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-614 to -616; id. §§ 2A-404 to -406; see also United Equities
Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 52 A.D.2d 154, 162, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6, 12 (1976) (basing
on § 2-614 a decision to allow defendant seller to provide a "commercially reasonable
substitute" despite the buyer's desire to reject the nonconforming goods), affd, 41
N.Y.2d 1032, 363 N.E.2d 1385, 395 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1977).
85 See B. CLARK & C. SMITH, supra note 81, 7.02[2], at 7-11 ("When the
breach involves only a minor nonconformity, many courts do not hesitate to carve out a
de minimus exception to the general rule."); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66,
§ 8-3, at 304-05 ("We conclude ... the law would be little changed if 2-601 gave the
right to reject only upon 'substantial' nonconformity."). But see H. GREENBERG,
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER U.C.C. ARTICLE 2, at 323 & n.66 (1987) (suggesting
that the degree of nonconformity necessary for rejection may still be less than that
required for revocation).
88 U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 2A-509(2).
87 See id. §§ 2-606(1)(b), 2A-515(1)(b).
Id. §§ 2-508(1), 2A-513(1).
89 Id. §§ 2-508(2), 2A-513(2).
19891
982 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
provision "seeks to avoid injustice to the seller by reason of a surprise
rejection by the buyer." 90 If the seller/lessor or supplier had reasonable
grounds to believe, perhaps through a prior course of dealing, course of
performance, or usage of trade, that the buyer/lessee would accept the
nonconforming tender, perhaps at a reduced price, then it is allowed
another chance to tender conforming goods, and is given a reasonable
time in which to do so. 1
D. Revocation
Finally, even after a buyer/lessee accepts, either directly or
through an ineffective rejection, it may still resort to revocation of ac-
ceptance. The terms of the revocation provisions, however, make much
more restrictive the availability of revocation as a remedy when com-
pared with rejection. 2 In order to revoke acceptance, several conditions
must be satified. First, the nonconformity of the goods must "substan-
tially" impair their value to the buyer/lessor who is not a finance
lessee." Second, if the buyer/lessor knew of the nonconformity, but ac-
90 Id. § 2-508 official comment; see also supra note 80 (discussing the applicabil-
ity of the § 2-508 official comment to § 2A-513).
91 See id. § 2-508 official comment; see also, e.g., North Am. Steel Corp. v.
Siderius, Inc., 75 Mich. App. 391, 400, 254 N.W.2d 899, 904 (1977) (recognizing that
trade usage acts as a contractual limitation of the rejection remedy under § 2-508);
Meads v. Davis, 22 N.C. App. 479, 481, 206 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1974) (interpreting
§ 2-508(2) and giving an example of when a seller may knowingly send a nonconform-
ing good to a buyer).
9 Section 2A-517 (Revocation of Acceptance of Goods) provides in full that:
(1) A lessee may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to the lessee if he [or she]
has accepted it:
(a) except in the case of a finance lease, on the reasonable assumption
that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably
cured; or
(b) without discovery of the nonconformity if the lessee's acceptance
was reasonably induced either by the lessor's assurances or, except in the
case of a finance lease, by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time af-
ter the lessee discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused
by the nonconformity. Revocation is not effective until the lessee notifies
the lessor.
(3) A lessee who so revokes has the same rights and duties with re-
gard to the goods involved as if the lessee had rejected them.
Section 2-608 (Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part) applies to buyers
and sellers, rather than lessees and lessors, and does not refer to finance leases; other-
wise, its lnguage is similar.
$' U.C.C. §§ 2-608(1), 2A-517(1).
The official comment notes that "the question is whether the non-conformity is
such as will in fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the
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cepted on the assumption that it would be cured, the assumption must
have been "reasonable" and the nonconformity not seasonably cured.'
If, on the other hand, the buyer/lessor accepted without knowing of the
nonconformity, in order to revoke, the acceptance must have been "rea-
sonably induced" either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance
or by the seller/lessor's assurances.95 Furthermore, for revocation to be
effective, it must occur within a "reasonable time," and the buyer/
lessee must notify the seller/lessor,96 as is required for rejection. The
time taken to revoke is measured from the time the buyer/lessee actu-
ally discovered or should have discovered the ground for revocation, but
the "reasonable time" period may be shortened if there is "any sub-
stantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by" the
defects or nonconformity.
9 7
For true finance lessees, the conditions for revocation are even
more restrictive. A finance lessee cannot revoke if it knew of the non-
conformity before acceptance.9" Nor can it revoke on the ground that it
had not discovered the nonconformity before acceptance, if that accept-
ance had been induced only by the difficulty of discovery; in such a
situation, it would not matter whether the acceptance had been reason-
ably induced.99 A finance lessee may revoke acceptance only if it had
not discovered the nonconformity and only if acceptance had been rea-
sonably induced by the finance lessor's assurances. 00
Another significant way in which rejection and revocation differ is
in the opportunity to cure. While rejection permits the seller/lessor or
supplier to cure the nonconformity, 101 revocation does not.1 2 Thus,
seller had no advance knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances." Id. § 2-
608 official comment. Nevertheless, White and Summers do not believe that a single,
objective test, without reference to the particular buyer, would make much of a differ-
ence. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 8-3, at 309 (stating that "we
suspect that a single standard of objective 'substantial nonconformity' will cover 99.44%
of all rejection and revocation cases").
" See U.C.C. §§ 2-608(1)(a), 2A-517(1)(a).
95 Id. §§ 2-608(1)(b), 2A-517(1)(b).
9, Id. §§ 2-608(2), 2A-517(2).
Id. §§ 2-608(2), 2A-517(2); see also Royal Business Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine
Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 48 (7th Cir. 1980) (requiring that the revocation occur within a
reasonable time and before any substantial change in the condition of the goods); Fargo
Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 381 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (holding that the use and depreciation of the good constituted a substantial
change in the good's condition not caused by its own defects, so that revocation was
barred).
9' See U.C.C. § 2A-516(2).
99 See id. § 2A-517(1)(b).
100 See id. § 2A-517(1).
101 See id. §§ 2-508, 2A-513.
102 See id. §§ 2-608, 2A-517. For cases discussing revocation in the sales context,
see, e.g., Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 193, 668 P.2d 65, 69-
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once revocation has taken place or the "reasonable time" in which revo-
cation must occur has passed, the parties may no longer make use of
these goods-oriented principles to shift ownership of, or responsibility
for, the goods back and forth among themselves.
In addition, burdens of proof differ in rejection and revocation.
10 3
After a rejection, the seller/lessor has the burden to show that the
goods and their tender conformed to the contract; after a revocation, the
buyer/lessee must establish any breach or default by the seller/
lessor.'04
After an effective revocation, as after a rejection, the buyer/lessee
may treat the seller/lessor as having breached' 0 5 or defaulted on 0 6 the
contract. Consequently, it may seek various remedies, such as return of
that part of the purchase price already paid'07 and reimbursement for
cover.' 08 If, on the other hand, a nonconformity surfaces after the time
for revocation has expired, then the buyer/lessee may have recourse for
breach of warranty.'09 Although the buyer/lessee will have recourse for
nonconforming goods in either case, after rejection or revocation, it will
no longer own, or be responsible for the rent for, the defective goods.
This is especially important if the seller/lessor or supplier is unable,
perhaps because of bankruptcy, or unwilling to remedy the noncon-
formity or pay damages. In a three-party transaction, such as a true or
security interest finance lease, being able to reject or revoke may allow
the finance lessee to place the ensuing loss on the finance lessor."0 This
70 (1983) ("[T]he Uniform Commercial Code does not allow a seller the right to cure
defects following a buyer's acceptance [and revocation] of the goods." (citing Bonebrake
v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974); Linscott v. Smith, 3 Kan. App. 2d 1, 587 P.2d
1271 (1978); Note, supra note 78)); Diversified Human Resources Group, Inc. v. PB-
KBB, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that, after revocation,
"the seller does not have a right to cure by repairs or replacement" (citing Gappelberg
v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1984))).
103 See H. GREENBERG, supra note 85, § 21.22, at 323 & nn.67-68.
104 See U.C.C. §§ 2-607(4), 2A-516(3)(c); see also Printing Center of Tex., Inc.
v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (placing on
the seller the burden of proving wrongful rejection); Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J.
277, 289, 440 A.2d 1345, 1351 (1982) (placing on the buyer the burden of proving a
nonconformity sufficient to justify revocation).
It is likely that a similar distribution of burdens would apply to leases, because the
rules governing sales serve as persuasive authority for courts interpreting Article 2A.
See U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment ("[A]ny case law interpreting [provisions of
Article 2 that were carried over] should be viewed as persuasive but not binding on a
court when deciding a similar issue with respect to leases.").
105 See U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
'o See id. § 2A-508(1).
107 See id. §§ 2-711(1), 2A-508(1)(b).
108 See id. §§ 2-711(1)(a), 2A-508(1)(c).
109 See id. §§ 2-714(2), 2A-519(4).
110 If the finance lease is a true lease, then § 2A-508(1) will apply; if it is a
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is the principal concern regarding rejection and revocation in finance
leases.
Because it occurs later in the course of the transaction and is more
restricted in operation than rejection, revocation of acceptance is a rem-
edy that is usually thought to be an extension of the right to reject."'
Revocation is, in a sense, simply a later form of rejection. 12 Specifi-
cally, the Code provides that a buyer/lessee who revokes "has the same
rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if [it] had rejected
them." ' Because revocation of acceptance comes later, however, it
should not be surprising that the requirements for revocation are more
exacting than those for rejection, 14 for the longer the buyer/lessee
keeps the goods, the more likely it is that any defects were caused or
aggravated by the buyer/lessee, rather than having been present at de-
livery." ' It is also more possible that the goods have depreciated in
value or that the buyer/lessee has benefited from use of the goods."1
This may explain why, although the degrees of nonconformity required
for rejection and revocation are very similar in practice, 1 the opportu-
nity to invoke the latter remedy is more limited.
It has been suggested, convincingly, that the possibility of revoca-
tion after acceptance renders workable the perfect tender rule as em-
bodied in Articles 2 and 2A. s If revocation were not available, then
rejection would be used more frequently, and for relatively minor non-
conformities. In view of the complexity of many modern goods and the
prohibitive costs of thoroughly inspecting such goods at delivery, rejec-
tion for insubstantial nonconformities would be used by buyer/lessees
to gain time to examine goods further while the goods remained in their
security interest lease, then § 2-711(1) will apply.
"I See Johnson v. GMC, Chevrolet Motors Div., 233 Kan. 1044, 1046, 668 P.2d
139, 142 (1983) ("Rejection is the buyer's refusal to keep delivered goods. . . .Revo-
cation of acceptance is a refusal to keep delivered goods that occurs after a buyer has
accepted and the time for rejection has expired.").
112 See Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J. 277, 288, 440 A.2d 1345, 1350-51 (1982)
("Revocation of acceptance is like rejection, but occurs after the buyer has accepted the
goods.").
a U.C.C. §§ 2-608(3), 2A-517(3).
14 See Johnson, 233 Kan. at 1046, 668 P.2d at 142 ("The right to reject goods is
a remedy that is more available since rejection occurs prior to the buyer's acceptance.");
Ramirez, 88 N.J. at 286, 440 A.2d at 1349 ("After acceptance, the Code strikes a
different balance: the buyer may revoke acceptance only if the nonconformity substan-
tially impairs the value of goods to him.").
1 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 8-3, at 301.
16 See id.
117 See "supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
"Is See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Ger-Beck Mach. Co., 806 F.2d 1207, 1216
(3d Cir. 1986) (dissenting opinion) (citing Peters, supra note 78, at 206-08).
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possession."1 9 By delaying acceptance, the buyer/lessee may increase
the chance that important defects will come to light in the interval
before the seller/lessor's cure. Allowing for the possibility of a later
revocation for a nonconformity that substantially impairs the value of
the goods eliminates this type of posturing by preserving the buyer/
lessee's right to return the goods. Consequently, recognizing the right to
revoke acceptance serves to "simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions" ' and "to permit the continued ex-
pansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement
of the parties.
'121
E. Limiting Revocation
Both rejection and revocation turn on nonconformity in the goods
or the seller/lessor's performance. If the goods conform and the per-
formance is satisfactory, and both "are in accordance with the obliga-
tions of the contract,"' 22 the buyer/lessee has no cause to reject or re-
voke. Therefore, if the seller/lessor makes no representations in the
contract and disclaims all warranties, 23 it may be able to require the
buyer/lessee's acceptance. 2' Alternatively, it may be able to limit the
remedies available to the buyer/lessee so as to preclude revocation of
acceptance or even rejection. Nevertheless, there are a few pitfalls asso-
ciated with either course of action.
First, consider limitation of remedies. The Code sets up no obsta-
cles to limiting rejection or revocation specifically. For example, a seller
may limit the buyer's remedies to replacement or repair. 1 2 Indeed, the
11 Rejected goods generally remain in the buyer/lessee's hands while awaiting
the seller/lessor's disposition. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602 to -604; id. §§ 2A-511 to -512.
120 Id. § 1-102(2)(a).
121 Id. § 1-102(2)(b).
122 Id. § 2-106(2).
122 See id. §§ 2-316, 2A-214 (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties).
124 See H. GREENBERG, supra note 85, § 21.23, at 323 (noting that if the seller
disclaims all express or implied warranties, "[b]oth rejection and revocation are pre-
cluded despite the existence of what ordinarily would have been a defect in the goods if
the goods had been expressly or impliedly warranted"); see also B. CLARK & C.
SMITH, supra note 81, 1 7.0314], at 7-33 ("[Wihen the seller effectively disclaims war-
ranty liability, there is no longer a right for which revocation can serve as a remedy.").
But see Frantz Lithographic Serv., Inc. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 485, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that warranty disclaimers do not bar
revocation when there is a substantial impairment in the value of the goods); Blacken-
ship v. Northtown Ford, Inc., 95 Ill. App. 3d 303, 306-07, 420 N.E.2d 167, 171 (1981)
(holding that "revocation of acceptance is appropriate even if the dealer has properly
disclaimed all implied warranties").
12Under Article 2, a buyer's right to reject is expressly made subject to contrac-
tual limitations on remedies. See U.C.C. § 2-601; see also H. GREENBERG, supra note
85, § 21.23, at 324 (stating that a seller may limit the buyer's remedy exclusively to
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general provisions governing limitation of remedies allow the agreement
between the parties to provide for remedies "in substitution for those
provided" '126 in the Code, and they may be "exclusive." '127 When, how-
ever, "circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act,"12'
which may include rejection or revocation. Furthermore, the Code gives
courts the power to invalidate unconscionable contract provisions." 9
That power, by implication, would also enable a court to allow rejec-
tion or revocation if a limitation on remedies is held unconscionable.
The official comment explains:
[It] is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least
minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties in-
tend to conclude a contract for sale within [Article 2] they
must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair
quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties
outlined in the contract.130
This policy has been applied to leases as well." 1 Article 2A adopts this
position."32
The Code recognizes three types of warranties under which
a buyer/lessee may claim a nonconformity in the goods: implied war-
ranties,133 express warranties,1 3 4 and, in the case of sales, the warranty
of title 33 or, in the case of leases, the warranty against interfer-
the repair or replacement of the goods sold); id. § 15.20, at 244-45 (stating that limita-
tions of the buyer's remedies must be articulated in the contract of sale in "clear and
unambiguous language"); ef. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 758
F.2d 1073, 1074 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowing a contractual disclaimer of warranties
that limited the seller's liability to replacement or repair, but deciding on another
ground). Although Article 2A does not contain such-an express provision, such an in-
terpretation would not be inconsistent with it. See U.C.O. § 2A-509.
126 U.C.C. §§ 2-719(1), 2A-503(1).
127 Id. §§ 2-719(2), 2A-503(2).
128 Id. § 2-719(2). Section 2A-503(2) employs similar language.
129 See id. §§ 2-302, 2A-108.
130 Id. § 2-719 official comment.
131 See Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 705-06, 324 S.E.2d 462,
469-70 (1985) (ruling that a finance lessee could revoke acceptance, even though the
lease had contemplated only replacement or repair, when the replacement and repair
had been repeatedly inadequate).
132 See U.C.C. § 2A-503(2) ("If circumstances cause an exclusive or limited rem-
edy to fail of its essential purpose, or provision for an exclusive remedy is unconsciona-
ble, remedy may be had as provided in this Article."); see also id. § 2A-503 official
comment ("Subsection (2) makes explicit with respect to [Article 2A] what is implicit in
Section 2-719 with respect to the Article on Sales (Article 2): if an exclusive remedy is
held to be unconscionable, remedies under this Article are available.").
133 See id. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2A-212, 2A-213.
13, See id. §§ 2-313, 2A-210.
13I See id. § 2-312.
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ence."' These warranties may be disclaimed in different ways. Implied
warranties generally can be excluded with expressions such as "as is"
or "with all faults.11 3 7 The warranty of title or the warranty against
interference may be disclaimed by "specific" language to that effect.138
Express warranties, in contrast, are more difficult to disclaim.13 9 One
reason is that "[w]ords or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit a warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other."14 The other reason is that "negation or limitation is inopera-
tive to the extent that the construction is unreasonable." 4 1 The latter
provision is tempered, 42 however, by the sections on parol or extrinsic
evidence, which allow the exclusion of "evidence of any prior agree-
ment or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."'s4
It would thus seem best not to give express warranties in the first
place. However, in identifying a good as, say, a "car," one may be
creating an express warranty that a good conforming to this general
description will be tendered. Whether the good must be capable of con-
veying passengers on a highway or whether the seller/lessor has only
described the good's general nature and function, rather than expressly
characterized its quality, some representation by the seller/lessor has
occurred.' 4 4 Consequently, should something totally different, like a
wooden box, be tendered, the good would not conform to the
contract.'4 5
The apparently similar concept of "total failure of performance"
has been used to make inapplicable disclaimers of warranties. In one
case, the seller failed to send a competent service engineer to install the
purchased machinery for the buyer, as required by the contract. The
machinery was improperly installed and damage resulted. The court
138 See id. § 2A-211.
137 See id. §§ 2-316(3)(a), 2A-214(3)(a).
138 See id. §§ 2-312(2), 2A-214(4).
See id. §§ 2-316(1), 2-317, 2A-214(1), 2A-215; see also J. WHrrE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 66, §§ 12-1 to -4 (discussing disclaiming of express warranties); cf.
id. § 12-7 (discussing cumulation and conflict of warranties).
140 U.C.C. § 2A-214(1); see also id. § 2-316(1) (omitting "a" after "negate or
limit").
141 Id. § 2A-214(1); see also id. § 2-316(1) (employing "such construction" in-
stead of "the construction").
142 See id. §§ 2-316(1), 2A-214(1) (subjecting the operation of negation and limi-
tation to the provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence).
143 Id. §§ 2-202, 2A-202.
144 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 9-3, at 331-32.
141 See Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 26, 32-33 (1980).
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ruled that:
If [the seller] had provided a competent engineer . . . and
that engineer had not performed as expected, there would be
a breach of warranty . . . In contrast, if [the engineer had
not been qualified], then by supplying him [the seller] failed
to perform at all as promised under the contract. Such a fail-
ure would constitute a total failure of performance, a breach
of contract for which the warranty disclaimer would not pro-
tect [the seller] .... "'
Conceivably, failure of performance in some circumstances, even in the
presence of valid warranty disclaimers, may suffice to justify
revocation.
147
In summary, revocation of acceptance is an integral part of the
remedies envisaged in Articles 2 and 2A. Along with the cure provi-
sions, revocation serves to temper the perfect tender rule of rejection.
Without revocation, buyers and lessors may be more inclined to reject
goods for trivial reasons, thereby burdening commercial practices.
Therefore, in determining whether a lease or sale allows for revocation,
it is important that great weight be given to what the parties actually
bargained for. Because one would not expect a party to bargain away
all of its remedies, courts occasionally find that the lessee or buyer re-
served the right to reject or revoke, even when the contract may be
interpreted otherwise. Given these considerations, this Comment sug-
gests that, when a finance lease lacks a specific provision concerning
revocation, or is unclear in that respect, some form of revocation should
be preserved. Part III demonstrates that the framework provided by
Article 2A for dealing with finance leases is reasonable for both true
and security interest finance leases.
140 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 758 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th
Cir. 1985).
14"7 Indeed, one Court of Appeals judge has equated the concepts. See General
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Ger-Beck Mach. Co., 806 F.2d 1207, 1214 (3d Cir. 1986) (dis-
senting opinion) ("Because the lathe was substantially nonconforming, there has been a
failure of consideration and [the lessee] has the right under Article Two to revoke its
acceptance."); see also Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W.
Burns, 710 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (ruling disclaimer provisions in a
finance lease agreement to be unconscionable because the copying machine's incapabil-
ity of performing its intended function constituted "complete failure of consideration,"
so that the contract was "rescinded").
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III. THE TRUE FINANCE LEASE VERSUS THE SECURITY INTEREST
FINANCE LEASE
This Part first examines the type of finance lease transaction con-
templated by Article 2A and how it relates to the limited opportunity
for a lessee to seek revocation of acceptance against the finance lessor.
The Article 2A approach to true finance leases is then compared with
the analyses of security interest finance leases advanced by the majority
and the dissent in General Electric Credit Corp. v. Ger-Beck Machine
Co. (GECC).48 This Part concludes that the treatment of true finance
leases provided in Article 2A also should be adopted for security inter-
est leases.
A. The True Finance Lease
The true finance lease, as contemplated by Article 2A, envisions
the finance lessor as serving only a financing function. This is reflected
in the article's definition of the terminology associated with finance
leases and in the article's operation on the parties, particularly with
respect to transfer of the benefit of the supply contract, irrevocability of
the lessee's promises, warranties, risk of loss, and acceptance, rejection,
and revocation.
1. Definitions
The definitions pertinent to finance leases are collected in section
2A-103(1). First, the finance lease is a "lease," 149 while a "lease" is a
"transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in re-
turn for consideration," not including a sale or security interest.1 50 In
addition, the parties to a lease, the "lessee" and the "lessor," will be
parties to both a "lease agreement" and a "lease contract." A "lease
agreement" is "the bargain, with respect to the lease, of the lessor and
the lessee.' 15' A "lease contract" is "the total legal obligation that re-
sults from the lease agreement.' 52 In a finance lease, there is also a
"supply contract" as well as a "supplier." The "supplier" is the "per-
son from whom a lessor buys or leases goods to be leased under a fi-
nance lease.' 53 The "supply contract" is the "contract under which a
148 806 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1986).
149 See U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g).
150 Id. § 2A-103(1)(j).
161 Id. § 2A-103(1)(k).
152 Id. § 2A-103(1)(/).
... Id. § 2A-103(1)(x).
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lessor buys or leases goods to be leased."' "
From these definitions, it would appear that in a sale-and-lease-
back, a kind of finance lease,1 55 the supplier and the lessee would be
the same person. Such a reading, however, would render redundant
and inconsistent those later sections of Article 2A that refer to the sup-
plier.156 It would also not make sense for there to be no supplier in a
sale-and-leaseback. Consequently, it must be that in a sale-and-lease-
back, the "supplier" is the third party from whom the finance lessee
first obtained the goods before selling the goods and assigning its rights
to the finance lessor. Similarly, the "supply contract" in the case of a
sale-and-leaseback must be the contract between the third-party sup-
plier and the finance lessee that was later assigned to the finance lessor.
In addition to satisfying the article's definition of a lease, a "fi-
nance lease" must meet three additional requirements. These require-
ments ensure that the finance lessor's primary role is to provide financ-
ing. First, the lessor must not serve a function of producing or dealing
in the goods; second, it must have obtained the goods in connection with
the lease; and third, either the lessee sees the supply contract before
signing the lease contract or its approval of the supply contract is re-
quired before the lease contract can be binding on it.' 57 The official
comment contemplates that:
[t]he supplier manufactures or supplies the goods pursuant
to the lessee's specification, perhaps even pursuant to a
purchase order, sales agreement or lease agreement between
the supplier and the lessee. After the prospective finance
lease is negotiated, a purchase order, sales agreement, or
lease agreement is entered into by the lessor (as buyer or
prime lessee) or an existing order, agreement or lease is as-
signed by the lessee to the lessor, and the lessor and the
1I- Id. § 2A-103(1)(y).
155 See id. § 2A-103(g) official comment; supra notes 2 & 62 and accompanying
text.
156 See, e.g., U.C.O. § 2A-209 (Lessee Under Finance Lease as Beneficiary of
Supply Contract); see also infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
transfer to the lessee of the supplier's obligations under the supply contract).
'17 The text of the provision states:
"Finance lease" means a lease in which (i) the lessor does not select,
manufacture or supply the goods, (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the
right to possession and use of the goods in connection with the lease, and
(iii) either the lessee receives a copy of the contract evidencing the lessor's
purchase of the goods on or before signing the lease contract, or the
lessee's approval of the contract evidencing the lessor's purchase of the
goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract.
U.C.C. § 2A-103(g).
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lessee then enter into a lease or sublease of the goods."' 8
The official comment further notes that the lessee is to look almost
solely to the supplier for representations, covenants, and warranties,
but the lessor may undertake to perform on some of these obligations.
The official comment explains the reasons for the three require-
ments. That the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods
justifies "releasing the lessor from most of its traditional liability." '59
Requiring that the goods or the rights to their use be acquired by the
lessor in connection with the lease "insure[s] the lessee's [sole] reliance
on the supplier."1 60 Consequently, because the lessee is to look almost
entirely to the supplier for representations, covenants, and warranties,
the lessee is bound by the lease agreement only if it first sees or later
approves of the supply contract.1"'
2. Redirecting the Obligations
Section 2A-209 makes explicit what the official comment mentions
in section 2A-103(g): The finance lessee is the beneficiary of the supply
contract. Subsection (1) states:
The benefit of the supplier's promises to the lessor
under the supply contract and of all warranties, whether ex-
press or implied, under the supply contract, extends to the
lessee to the extent of the lessee's leasehold interest under a
finance lease related to the supply contract, but subject to the
terms of the supply contract and all of the supplier's defenses
or claims arising therefrom."6 2
The official comment explains that this provision is self-executing and,
as a matter of policy, may not be excluded, modified, or limited. 6 '
Consequently, "selective discrimination" against the finance lessee,
meaning "exclusion of the supplier's liability to the lessee with respect
to warranties made to the lessor," is precluded.'"
Subsection (2) limits the effect on the parties of the extension of
the benefit by providing that subsection (1) "does not: (a) modify the
rights and obligations of the parties to the supply contract, whether
arising therefrom or otherwise, or (b) impose any duty or liability
158 Id. § 2A-103(g) official comment.
159 Id.
160 Id.
181 See id.
162 Id. § 2A-209(1).
16 See id. § 2A-209 official comment.
164 Id.
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under the supply contract on the lessee." ' 5
Subsection (3) protects the lessee from modification or rescission of
the supply contract by the supplier and the lessor. If the supplier has
notice of the finance lease, the change will be ineffective against the
lessee. 6' In addition, the lessee has a cause of action against the lessor
if the modification or rescission occurs after the lessee entered into the
lease; in that case, if the supplier also had notice of the lease, the lessee
will have a cause of action against it as well.1" 7
Section 2A-407"68 presents the finance lessee with the flip side of
the coin by making the lessee's promises under the lease irrevocable and
independent upon its acceptance of the goods. The purpose of this "hell
or high water" provision is indicated by the specific reference in clause
(2)(a) to "assignees of the parties." The official comment explicitly
states that this section "requires the lessee to perform even if the les-
sor's performance after the lessee's acceptance is not in accordance with
the lease contract." '69 Such a stance is viewed as "appropriate because
the benefit of the supplier's promises and warranties to the lessor under
the supply contract is extended to the lessee under the finance lease."170
These rights that Article 2A confers on true finance lessors, how-
ever, are more powerful than those that Article 9 gives to security inter-
est lessors. Section 9-206(1) provides that buyers or (security interest)
lessees may make agreements not to assert defenses against assignees,
and that such agreements are enforceable by assignees who take the
assignment "for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or
defense." ' Note that, unlike section 2A-407, this provision is permis-
165 Id. § 2A-209(2).
166 See id. § 2A-209(3).
167 See id.
168 Section 2A-407 (Irrevocable Promises: Finance Leases) provides in full:
(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease the
lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and indepen-
dent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods.
(2) A promise that has become irrevocable and independent under
subsection (1):
(a) is effective and enforceable between the parties, and by or against
third parties including assignees of the parties, and
(b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, modification, repudia-
tion, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the parties to whom the
promise runs.
Id. § 2A-407.
169 Id. § 2A-407 official comment (emphasis added).
170 Id.
171 Id. § 9-206(1); see also Equico Lessors, Inc. v. Rockville Reminder, Inc., 492
A.2d 528, 530 (1985) (ruling that the assignee of a lease could not enforce the waiver
of defenses provision of § 9-206(1) because it had not taken the assignment without
notice of a claim or defense); Chemical Bank v. Rinden Professional Ass'n, 126 N.H.
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sive, so that the lessee may choose not to make such an agreement.
Further, note that, except for the obligation of good faith,172 the as-
signee of a true finance lessor, under Article 2A, need not meet the
other requirements in order to be free from claims and defenses.1 7
These two differences translate into a benefit conferred on the assignor,
because it will obtain a more valuable right to sell. There would seem
to be no principled basis for giving this valuable advantage to true fi-
nance lessors, but not to security interest finance lessors.
The harshness of section 2A-407 is mitigated by its being "subject
to . . . the lessee's revocation of acceptance." 74 Because the lessee's
right to revoke against a finance lessor is very limited, 7 however, this
concession is of limited benefit to the lessee.
3. Warranties
In keeping with the policy that a finance lessee should look almost
exclusively to the supplier for representations, covenants, and warran-
688, 692-95, 498 A.2d 706, 711-12 (1985) (finding a waiver of defenses clause to be
valid under § 9-206(1) when the assignee of a lease had taken the assignment for
value, in good faith, and without notice of a claim or defense).
Section 9-206(1) (Agreement Not to Assert Defenses Against Assignee) provides in
full:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by the buyer or
lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense
which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an as-
signee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without no-
tice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be
asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under
the Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
makes such an agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-206(1). The official comment explains that this provision follows the law
of negotiable instruments, and it is apparent that an assignee allowed to enforce such
an agreement must meet requirements similar to those met by a holder in due course.
See id. § 9-206(1) official comment; cf. id. § 3-302(1) ("A holder in due course is a
holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without
notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it
on the part of any person."). Interestingly, the official comment to § 9-206 states that
"[tihe same rules are made applicable to leases as to security agreements, whether or
not the lease is intended as security." Id. § 9-206(1) official comment (emphasis
added). One wonders why the drafters, in creating § 2A-407 and thereby supplanting
the official comment, abandoned this consistent treatment for all leases. For a case that
applied § 9-206(1) without inquiring into the nature of the lease, see Equico Lessors,
492 A.2d at 530.
172 See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2A-103(4).
173 See id. § 2A-407(2)(a).
174 Id. § 2A-407 official comment.
See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
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ties, the provisions on the creation of warranties restrict a finance lessor
to responsibility only for express warranties and warranties against in-
terference.'1 6 For express warranties, "[a]ny affirmation of fact or
promise made by the lessor to the lessee which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods will conform to the affirmation or promise."'1 7 7 With
respect to the warranty against interference, in each lease contract there
is a "warranty that for the lease term no person holds a claim to or
interest in the goods that arose from an act or omission of the lessor,
other than a claim by way of infringement or the like, which will inter-
fere with the lessee's enjoyment of its leasehold interest. '17 8 Both provi-
sions require very little of the finance lessor if the proper precautions
are taken.17
9
4. Risk of Loss
The risk-of-loss provisions in Article 2A'80 also reflect the general
scheme identified above. In a lease, the risk of loss is generally placed
on the lessor, but in a finance lease it passes to the lessee. 8 When,
however, goods identified to a lease contract suffer a total loss before
the risk of loss passes to the lessee, then the contract is "avoided" and
both parties bear their own losses.' 2 These rules are modified by the
effects of rejection and revocation.' 8 When the condition of the goods
confers on the finance lessee the right to reject, the risk of loss is on the
supplier until cure or acceptance.' 4 If the lessee rightfully revokes ac-
178 "Except in a finance lease," a lease contract may imply a warranty of
merchantability or a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. U.C.C. §§ 2A-212,
2A-213.
1 Id. § 2A-210(1)(a).
178 Id. § 2A-211(1).
1"79 See supra notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
180 See U.C.C. §§ 2A-219 to -221.
181 See id. § 2A-219(1).
182 See id. § 2A-221(a).
's' Section 2A-220(1) provides:
Where risk of loss is to pass to the lessee and the time of passage is
not stated:
(a) If a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the lease
contract as to give a right of rejection, the risk of their loss remains with
the lessor, or, in the case or a finance lease, the supplier, until cure or
acceptance.
(b) If the lessee rightfully revokes acceptance, he [or she], to the ex-
tent of any deficiency in his [or her] effective insurance coverage, may
treat the risk of loss as having remained with the lessor from the
beginning.
Id. § 2A-220(1).
18' See id. § 2A-220(1)(a).
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ceptance, then, to the extent that there is a deficiency in the lessee's
insurance coverage, the risk of loss is borne by the lessor.185
Although adequate insurance would make these provisions unnec-
essary, recognizing that the risk of loss is tied in some sense to ultimate
responsibility for or ownership of the goods reveals an interesting pat-
tern. When the lessee would have the right to reject, Article 2A imposes
ultimate responsibility for the goods on the supplier. 8 In contrast,
when the lessee revokes acceptance, the lessor bears the ultimate re-
sponsibility. 8 ' Thus, it seems that in a true finance lease rejection is a
remedy to be had ultimately against the supplier, while revocation
works against the lessor.
5. Acceptance, Rejection, and Revocation
The acceptance, rejection, and revocation provisions in Article 2A
all seem to bear out the observation that rejection redounds to the sup-
plier, while revocation primarily affects the finance lessor; nevertheless,
some confusion remains. Under section 2A-515(1), a finance lessee ac-
cepts goods if, after a reasonable opportunity to inspect, it "signifies or
acts with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies to the lessor or
the supplier that the goods are conforming or that [it] will take or re-
tain them." '88 In order to reject goods not conforming to the lease con-
tract, however, the lessee must seasonably notify the lessor 89 Yet ei-
ther the lessor or the supplier may attempt a cure.' 90
Similarly, failure of the lessee seasonably to state objections effects
a waiver of the objections if the lessor or the supplier could have cured
the defect.'' Furthermore, a lessee's duties with respect to rightfully
rejected goods lie with both the lessor and the supplier.'92 The lessee
may, however, revoke acceptance "without discovery of the noncon-
formity if the lessee's acceptance was reasonably induced . . . by the
lessor's assurances."'
93
The official comment to section 2A-516 clarifies some of this ap-
185 See id. § 2A-220(1)(b).
186 See id. § 2A-220(1)(a).
187 See id. § 2A-220(1)(b).
18 Id. § 2A-515(1)(a) (emphasis added).
188 See id. § 2A-509(2).
180 See id. § 2A-513(1).
"I See id. § 2A-514(1)(a).
182 See id. § 2A-511 (merchant lessee's duties); id. § 2A-512 (non-merchant
lessee's duties).
193 Id. § 2A-517(1)(b) (emphasis added).
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parent confusion:
Subsection (2) creates a special rule for finance leases,
precluding revocation if acceptance is made with knowledge
of nonconformity with respect to the lease agreement, as op-
posed to the supply agreement; this is not inequitable as the
lessee has a direct claim against the supplier. Section 2A-
209(1). Revocation of acceptance of a finance lease is permit-
ted if the lessee's acceptance was without discovery of the
nonconformity (with respect to the lease agreement, not the
supply agreement) and was reasonably induced by the les-
sor's assurances. Section 2A-517(1)(b). Absent exclusion or
modification, the lessor under a finance lease makes certain
warranties to the lessee. Sections 2A-210 and 2A-211(1).
Revocation of acceptance is not prohibited even after the
lessee's promise has become irrevocable and independent.
Section 2A-407 official comment. Where the finance lease
creates a security interest, the rule may be to the contrary.'
Although section 2A-516(2) makes no specific reference to "non-
conformity with respect to the lease agreement," the official comment
may not represent an unwarranted interpretation of the term "con-
forming." Its reading is supported by the definition of "conforming,"
which refers only to goods or performance that conform "under a lease
contract."195 Because Article 2A deals only with leases, we must infer
that, where the term "nonconformity" appears, it actually means "non-
conformity with respect to the lease contract." Therefore, there are two
separate issues of conformity in a finance lease: conformity with the
lease contract and conformity with the supply contract. The finance
lessee's rights with respect to nonconformity in the supply contract are
derived from the supply contract itself, as made applicable to the lessee
by the operation of the redirection provisions."' Therefore, if the sup-
ply contract is a sales contract, then acceptance, rejection, and revoca-
tion of acceptance by the lessee are governed by Article 2. If the supply
contract is itself a lease contract, then it, as well as the lease between
the finance lessor and the finance lessee, is governed by Article 2A.
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that in the latter case the supply
contract is not itself a finance lease, the rights of the finance lessee to
reject or revoke acceptance of the supply contract will be similar
194 Id. § 2A-516 official comment (emphases added) (citing General Elec. Credit
Corp. v. Ger-Beck Mach. Co., 806 F.2d 1207 (1986)).
195 Id. § 2A-103(l)(d).
16 See id. § 2A-209; supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
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whether the supply contract is a sales contract or a lease.197
Given that rejection or revocation of the supply contract is distinct
from rejection or revocation of the finance lease contract, the remaining
confusion can be attributed to a reasonable, albeit unstated, assumption
in the finance lease provisions of Article 2A. The assumption is that,
when goods or performance conform to the supply contract, they will
conform to the lease contract, and when they do not conform to the
lease contract, they will not conform to the supply contract. This as-
sumption follows from an underlying assumption that a finance lessor
will generally promise less, and certainly not more, than the supplier
with regard to the goods or their tender or delivery. This is in keeping
with the view of the finance lessor as basically a conduit for the
goods. 98 When a lessee rightfully rejects goods on account of a noncon-
formity with respect to the lease contract, the lessor itself'99 may exer-
cise rejection against the supplier on the ground that the goods did not
conform to the supply contract. By the same token, when the lessee
meets all of the requirements of a justifiable revocation against the les-
sor, the lessor may turn around and revoke against the supplier. If the
lessee accepts, there are no problems. Therefore, if the goods or their
tender or delivery do not conform to the supply contract, but do con-
form to the lease contract, such as when there are no representations at
all by the lessor, then the lessee may reject or revoke acceptance of the
goods and cancel the supply contract,200 but the lessor and lessee would
still have a valid lease contract. In such a case, the lease contract would
probably provide for another tender by the supplier, substitution of an-
other supplier, or liquidated damages or the acceleration of rents.2"'
Given the underlying assumption, the apparent inconsistencies in
the acceptance, rejection, and revocation provisions are reconcilable. Be-
cause conformity with the supply contract implies conformity with the
lease contract, acceptance of the lease contract may be signified to either
the lessor or the supplier. °2 For the same reason, either the lessor or
the supplier may attempt a cure to effect conformity.20 3 Similarly, the
197 See supra notes 77 & 92-97 and accompanying text. Compare U.C.C. § 2-601
(giving buyers the right to reject) with id. § 2A-509 (giving lessees the right to reject);
id. § 2-608 (giving buyers the right to revoke) with id. § 2A-517 (giving lessees the
right to revoke).
"I See U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) official comment.
... Section 2A-209, which extends the benefits of the supply contract to the lessee,
does not take them away from the lessor. See id. § 2A-209.
200 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
201 See U.C.C. § 2A-504 (Liquidation of Damages); id. § 2A-529 (Lessor's Ac-
tion for the Rent).
202 See id. § 2A-515(1)(a).
203 See id. § 2A-513.
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lessee waives its objections if it does not seasonably state them and ei-
ther the lessor or the supplier could have cured the defect.2 ' On the
other hand, because nonconformity with the supply contract does not
imply nonconformity with the lease contract, if the lessee wishes to re-
ject the lease contract, it must notify the lessor, not the supplier.20 5
Conversely, because nonconformity with the lease contract implies non-
conformity with the supply contract, the lessor will be able to reject
against the supplier if the lessee rejects against the lessor.20 6 Hence, the
lessee's duties regarding rightfully rejected goods run to the lessor as
well as the supplier in order to preserve the lessor's right to reject.20 7
Finally, because revocation is against the lessor, the lessee must be in-
duced by the lessor's assurances,"' not the supplier's, and it must no-
tify the lessor,209 not the supplier.
Although it reconciles and explains the effects of the provisions,
this assumption is not applicable in all circumstances. It fails if the
lessor makes a representation in the lease contract with respect to the
goods that was not made by the supplier in the supply contract. This
might occur if the lessor turns out not to have acquired from the sup-
plier good title to the goods.210 It also fails if the lessor is found to have
a duty under the lease contract with respect to the goods or their tender
or delivery,211 such as not to interfere with the right of the lessee to
reject or revoke against the supplier. 12 Article 2A contemplates both of
these possibilities 213 without, however, contemplating the consequences
of such obligations. In such situations, if the goods do not conform to
the lessor's representation, or if the lessor does not discharge its duty,
then the lessee could reject or revoke acceptance of the lease contract,
although it may not be able to do so with respect to the supply contract.
20 See id. § 2A-514.
205 Id. § 2A-509(2).
101 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
201 See U.C.O. § 2A-511 (concerning merchant lessees' duties with respect to
rightfully rejected goods); id. § 2A-512 (concerning nonmerchant lessees' duties with
respect to rightfully rejected goods).
208 See id. § 2A-517(1)(b).
211 See id. § 2A-517(2).
210 This may result in a breach of the lessor's express warranties to the lessee or
its warranty against interference; alternatively, it may result in a failure of considera-
tion. See supra notes 133-47 & 176-79 and accompanying text.
211 In Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W. Burns, 710
S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), the finance lessor was found to have impliedly au-
thorized the supplier's salesman to act and make representations on its behalf, and so
the lessee was allowed to "rescind" the lease of a defective copier. See id. at 607.
212 See supra notes 133-47 & 176-79 and accompanying text.
See U.C.C. § 2A-211(1) (giving lessees a warranty against lessors' interfer-
ence); id. § 2A-103(1)(g) official comment ("[This definition [of 'finance lease'] does
not restrict the lessor's function solely to the supply of funds . . ").
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The effect of such a rejection or revocation would be to cancel the lease
contract. If the goods conform to the supply contract, however, the les-
sor would not be able to reject or revoke in turn against the supplier.
Thus, the lessor could be stuck with the goods and no lease.
This should be, and does appear to be, the working of the accept-
ance, rejection, and revocation provisions. If, however, it is true that
conformity to the supply contract is entirely independent of conformity
to the lease contract, then one major inconsistency remains in the provi-
sions. Because goods may conform to the supply contract, yet not con-
form to the lease contract, signifying to the supplier that the goods are
conforming should, for two reasons, not be relevant to acceptance with
respect to the lease contract.214 First, the supplier is unlikely to know of
the precise obligations in the lease contract. Second, even if the lessee
happens to signify directly to the supplier that the goods are con-
forming to the lease contract, there is still the question why, in the
absence of any agency or the like, that act should confer rights on the
lessor, a third party. Therefore, the reference to the supplier should
either be deleted from section 2A-515(1)(a) or appropriately qualified.
Given the above, why is revocation by the finance lessee more lim-
ited against the finance lessor than against the supplier? 15 Once again,
the answer lies in the implicit assumption pervading Article 2A that the
finance lessor's function is limited to serving as a financing party for
the lessee so that the lessee may obtain the desired goods. In the context
of a financing transaction, the financing party is likely to know even
less than the supplier about the business of the lessee, the usage of that
trade, and the condition of the goods when delivered. Therefore, the
reasons for making revocation more difficult to invoke than rejection
when used against the supplier are even more applicable to revocation
against the finance lessor.21
If the financing party's role is so limited, however, one might ask
why the finance lessee has any right of revocation, or even rejection,
against the lessor. The answer to this question is that, by entering into
a lease, the lessor undertakes to perform on certain promises and makes
certain warranties. To the extent that it cannot perform adequately, the
lessee should be entitled to some remedy. Rejection or revocation is not
an inappropriate remedy if one recognizes the distinction between rejec-
tion or revocation against, on one hand, the finance lessor, and, on the
214 See id. § 2A-515(1)(a).
215 In a finance lease, a lessee may revoke only if it was reasonably induced by the
lessor's assurances to accept before it had discovered the nonconformity. See supra notes
98-100 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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other hand, the supplier. Rejection or revocation against the finance
lessor affects only the continuing validity of the lease contract. The con-
ditions necessary for rejection or revocation depend only on the finance
lessor's performance, not the supplier's. From the finance lessor's point
of view, it should not be affected economically by whether performance
by the supplier is conforming or not. If the lessee rejects or revokes
against the supplier, the finance lessor should still be entitled to the
benefit of its bargain by the lessee either substituting a supplier or pay-
ing some sort of damages. Conversely, if the lessor fails to perform ade-
quately and the lessee rejects or revokes the lease contract, the supply
contract between the lessor and the supplier should remain valid. In the
typical case in which a nonconformity with respect to the lease contract
implicates a nonconformity with respect to the supply contract, the fi-
nance lessor is protected by being able to reject or revoke against the
supplier should the lessee reject or revoke the lease contract.
The official comment to section 2A-517 states that, although the
section was based on the analogous section 2-608, the rule was
"[r]evised to reflect leasing practices." ' This is an answer in itself:
The framework adopted by Article 2A for finance leases follows the
scheme commonly adopted by the parties.
B. The Security Interest Finance Lease
Although Article 2A provides explicit and rather comprehensive
treatment of true finance leases, the Code does not provide a corre-
sponding treatment for security interest finance leases.218 Nonetheless,
the necessary building blocks are present: transfer of the benefit of the
supply contract, irrevocability of the lessee's promises, applicability of
warranties, and risk of loss rules. The transfer of the benefit of the
supply contract in the case of security interest finance leases has been
developed in the case law. Courts have generally held that warranties
and representations provided by the supplier to the buyer can be as-
serted by the finance lessee.21 ' By the same token, most of the buyer's
remedies against the supplier are also available to the finance lessee.220
Irrevocability of the finance lessee's promises is dealt with in section 9-
21' U.C.C. § 2A-517 official comment.
218 See id. § 2A-103(1)(g) (defining "finance lease" as a form of true lease);
supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (noting that finance leases are leases).
219 See Harris, Recent Cases Relating to Equipment Leases, in BAsIcs OF EQUIP-
MENT LEASING 1987, supra note 2, at 177, 209-12; Reisman & Mooney, supra note 2,
at 53-54.
220 See Harris, supra note 219, at 215-29.
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206(1);221 risk of loss in breach is provided for in section 2-510; and
casualty to identified goods is treated in section 2-613.
As framed by the courts, the main Article 2 issue is whether the
supplier or the finance lessor is to be considered the seller under the
specific circumstances surrounding the lease. In General Electric
Credit Corp. v. Ger-Beck Machine Co. (GECC),222 the only case to
consider this question generally within the context of revocation of ac-
ceptance against the finance lessor, the answer given by a divided Court
of Appeals was that the seller was the supplier.22 The court found that
the finance lessor provided nothing in the three-way transaction except
the money to finance a sale between the supplier and the finance
lessee.224 It concluded as a matter of law that the transaction between
the finance lessor and the finance lessee was only a security transac-
tion."' Hence, it ruled that the transaction was outside the scope of
Article 2 and denied revocation to the lessee.228 In so reasoning, it re-
lied on a state court case, from the state where the court sat, that had
denied a finance lessee a remedy against the finance lessor for breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability.22
The dissenting judge did not agree that the finance lessor was
merely a financing party.228 He noted that the finance lessor used its
own standard forms so that it could inject itself into the chain of title
and that the lease specified that "the Equipment shall be at all times
the personal property of Lessor." '229 He considered the warranty of
merchantability case cited by the court not to be on point, because the
revocation of acceptance is very different from implied warranties.230
221 See id. at 230-33 (discussing case law); supra note 171 (discussing § 9-206(1)
and case law).
222 806 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1986) (2-1 decision).
222 See id. at 1209-10. But cf. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 706,
324 S.E.2d 462, 470 (1985) (ruling that a finance lessee could revoke acceptance
against a finance lessor when the finance lessor and supplier had the same stockholders,
directors, and officers, but not considering whether the lease was a true lease or a
security interest lease); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of Richard W.
Burns, 710 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (2-1 decision) (ruling that a finance
lessee was allowed to "rescind" against a finance lessor for failure of consideration,
although not considering whether the lease was a true lease or a security interest lease).
22 See GECC, 806 F.2d at 1211.
225 See id.
226 See id. at 1208, 1211.
227 See id. at 1209-11 (quoting Miller Auto Leasing Co. v. Weinstein, 189 N.J.
Super. 543, 461 A.2d 174 (Law Div. 1983), affid, 193 N.J. Super. 328, 473 A.2d 996
(App. Div. 1984), cert. denied, 97 N.J. 676, 483 A.2d 192 (1984)).
228 See id. at 1211 (dissenting opinion).
229 Id. at 1212 (dissenting opinion).
2' See id. at 1214-17 (dissenting opinion) (criticizing the majority's reading of
Miller Auto Leasing).
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The judge referred to the concerns behind the operation of acceptance
and the "perfect tender rule' 231 and explained that the different con-
cerns presented by the revocation of acceptance support its being ap-
plied more widely than implied warranties. 32 By way of support, he
relied on an assignment of lease case,233 similar to transaction C,234 for
the proposition that a transaction with both sales and security aspects is
within the scope of Article 2. Because in GECC the finance lessor had
acquired title to the goods, it was effectively the seller to the finance
lessee.235 Therefore, stated the dissent, the finance lessee could revoke
acceptance against the finance lessor.
The dissent did not, however, consider whether revocation against
the finance lessor might require different standards compared with rev-
ocation against the supplier. Although the goods did not conform to the
supplier's representations, 36 there is no suggestion that the lessor un-
dertook to make similar representations on its part. In all likelihood,
then, the defects in the goods did not implicate nonconformity with the
lease contract. Hence, revocation of the lease should not have been jus-
tified. Even if the goods were not in conformity with the lease contract
because of the defects, however, the lessor in this case had not seen the
goods or known of the defects.23 ' Acceptance had been induced by the
assurances of the supplier,238 but not of the lessor, and perhaps also by
the lessee's reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be
cured by the supplier. If Article 2A's scheme were to apply, revocation
against the finance lessor would be unjustified.3 9
The dissenting judge concluded by pointedly observing that the
real question presented by the case concerned the allocation of risk and
potential litigation expenses.240 Under normal circumstances, his ap-
proach would allow the finance lessor to revoke in its turn against the
supplier; in this instance, however, the supplier was in "financial diffi-
culty." 1 The lease contract could have allocated the risk explicitly, but
the issue of revocation was overlooked. Because the finance lessor was
231 See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
232 See GECC, 806 F.2d at 1216 (dissenting opinion).
233 See id. at 1213 (dissenting opinion) (citing Associates Discount Corp. v.
Palmer, 47 N.J. 183, 219 A.2d 858 (1966)).
23 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
135 See GECC, 806 F.2d at 1217 (dissenting opinion).
231 See id. at 1208.
237 See id. (describing how, although defects appeared in the lathe from the begin-
ning, the lessor was not notified of the problems for two years while the supplier at-
tempted to correct them).
228 See id. at 1208.
23 See U.C.C. §§ 2A-516(2), 2A-517(1).
240 See GECC, 806 F.2d at 1217 (dissenting opinion).
241 See id. (dissenting opinion).
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quite sophisticated, had considerable leverage, and had used its own
standard form, the contract could be read against the drafter.2 42 All of
these factors led the dissent to view as a question of fact whether the
finance lessor had done enough to make it a seller in this context, a
question that the jury had answered in the affirmative.
C. Reconciliation
The Code's general provisions support a reading that follows the
commercial practice, yet allows for variation by agreement of the par-
ties. First, "any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which [the
parties] are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give[s]
particular meaning to and supplement[s] or qualif[ies] terms of an
agreement. '2 43 Second, the UCC is to be "liberally construed and ap-
plied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,"2 44 among which
are "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions" 245 and "to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.
24 6
Third, "[tihe effect of [the] provisions of this Act may be varied by
agreement," 247 whether or not the words "unless otherwise agreed" ap-
pear in any particular provision.248 Finally, parties are accountable for
their bargaining: "The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed." 249 By implication,
if the other party has fully performed, then the first party can have no
complaint against it and, consequently, no remedy is necessary.
In accordance with these provisions, the rule with respect to ac-
ceptance, rejection, and revocation of acceptance should be the same in
the case of any finance lease, whether it is a true lease or one intended
as security. The concerns in both instances are the same. Because Arti-
cle 2A addresses substantially all of those concerns, while Articles 2
and 9 do not, the rule should substantially follow the provisions set
forth in Article 2A. To properly allocate the risks and costs of rejection
242 See id. (dissenting opinion).
243 U.C.C. § 1-205(3). Under § 1-205(2), "[a] usage of trade is any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question."
24 Id. § 1-102(1).
.45 Id. § 1-102(2)(a).
246 Id. § 1-102(2)(b).
247 Id. § 1-102(3).
248 Id. § 1-102(4).
24. Id. § 1-106.
[Vol. 137:967
FINANCE LESSEES' REVOCATION
and revocation between the parties, conformity to a lease contract
should be distinct from conformity to the supply contract. Neither the
finance lessor nor the supplier should be held accountable for the non-
conformity of the other's performance. Each party's own performance
should be the measure of the remedy for the finance lessee. This ap-
proach is fair, because the parties get the benefit of their separate bar-
gains, and no one is obliged to be the insurer of another without having
so undertaken. In this regard, both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in GECC can be reconciled with this position, because they
turned on facts that were open to differing interpretations. It is essen-
tial, however, that the parties be able, by agreement, to modify the ef-
fect of the rules in order to vary the allocation of the risks and costs. In
addition, in order to avoid surprises and simplify the drafting of agree-
ments, the "default setting" should be based on the predominant fi-
nance lease practice. Such a scheme accords with the underlying pur-
poses and policies of the Code.
IV. CONCLUSION
Revocation of acceptance is a remedy that is integral to the scheme
presented by the Uniform Commercial Code to deal with acceptance
and rejection of goods. However, its operation in the context of the
finance lease, a common and economically important transaction, needs
further review. Although the newly promulgated Article 2A on leases
provides a reasoned approach to finance leases that are true leases,
there is conflicting case law for finance leases that are security interest
leases. The underlying functions and motivations of both types of fi-
nance lease are the same. Consequently, a unified treatment should be
given to both types of finance lease. This Comment proposes that Arti-
cle 2A's approach, read in the proper light, is sufficiently coherent and
flexible to be adopted in the context of the security interest finance
lease.
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